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Neighbourhood watch
The evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia
The regional terrorist threat remains high on the list of Australia’s national security priorities. 
But the absence of a major bombing campaign in recent years has prompted some 
commentators to argue that we have seen the end of jihadist violence in Southeast Asia. 
Nearly six years after the first Bali bombings, it is time to take stock of the regional security 
environment and to ask how the Southeast Asian terrorist threat might evolve in the future.
Neighbourhood Watch analyses the changing nature of religious militancy across 
Southeast Asia and sets out a framework for understanding the forces and trends that are 
driving jihadist extremism in the region. It provides a comprehensive examination of the 
organisational and operational capabilities of the major terrorist groups including Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao and 
the various groups associated with Malay Muslim separatist violence in southern Thailand. In 
each case, the nature and extent of pan-regional networks and connections are examined.
Although these groups draw their rhetoric and ideology from the global jihadist movement, 
this ASPI paper shows that local ethnic and family ties remain a strong influence on group 
dynamics and linkages. As a result, the JI leadership in Indonesia has failed in its stated 
efforts to engineer a single zone of regional conflict. And the idea that sustained terrorist 
violence will achieve the political goal of a pan-Islamic caliphate across the region survives 
only in the most distorted and unrealistic assessments of the jihadi faithful.
The structure and organisation of these groups may have changed, but the underlying 
threat of terrorism remains. In particular, the policy responses of national governments 
will have an important bearing on the future direction of ethno-religious conflicts in the 
region. Complacency will remain one of the biggest challenges we face in pursuing effective 
counter-terrorism policies in the region.
Neighbourhood Watch makes a number of recommendations on the appropriate next 
steps in Australia’s regional counter-terrorism strategy including formalising the high-level 
political dialogue between ministers; paying closer attention to the enabling environment 
for terrorism in neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Cambodia; leading a regional 
diplomatic campaign to encourage universal adoption of international counter-terrorism 
conventions; assisting Indonesia with further legal reforms; and providing more aid to the 
Indonesian education system to end the indoctrination and radicalisation in schools that are 
associated with terrorism. 
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Cover image: Members of the Philippine’s largest Islamic rebel group Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) take up positions at a mosque inside the guerrilla base during the central 
committee hearing at the southern island of Mindanao 11 March 2008.  
© Romeo Ranoco/Reuters/Picture Media
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Australia’s national security is linked to the security and stability of our 
neighbours. Although the risk of state-based conflict has diminished in recent 
years, other challenges and pressures have emerged. This is particularly true of 
religiously-motivated terrorism in Southeast Asia, which remains an issue of direct 
relevance to the national security interests of Australia; most importantly, the safety 
of our citizens. Maintaining a close eye on the evolving dynamic of this threat is, 
therefore, both prudent and appropriate.
The authors of this report, Peter Chalk and Carl Ungerer, are well placed to make this 
assessment. Based on their extensive primary research in Southeast Asia, including 
interviews with senior government officials in each of the countries discussed, the 
two writers examine the current operational and organisational dynamics of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), as well as the two major zones of regional conflict—southern Thailand 
and the southern Philippines. 
Neighbourhood Watch examines the continuing relevance of the premise that 
terrorism and insurgencies in Southeast Asia are essentially ‘local’ in character and not 
representative of pan-regional influences or designs. In this way, the report presents a 
valuable contribution to understanding the contemporary nature of regional religious 
militancy by looking at terrorist groups and their connections across borders, rather 
than merely thinking of JI as simply ‘Indonesian’ or the Abu Sayyaf Group as only 
relevant to the Philippines.
The report concludes with a set of recommendations for Australia’s policy makers. 
It argues that given the cyclical nature of religious extremism in the region, 
assessments which talk of a diminishing terrorist threat in the future will likely prove 
premature. Although the organisational structure and capacity of Southeast Asian 
terrorist networks today is vastly different from the grandiose ideological agendas 
and strategic designs of the past, new trends are emerging that foreshadow a possible 
return to regional militancy. In particular, the recent growth of jihadist literature and 
internet propaganda has the potential to radicalise a new generation of recruits.
I thank the two authors for their efforts in producing this timely and insightful report 
on the evolving nature of regional terrorism. I am also grateful to Anthony Bergin, 
Janice Johnson and the external reviewers for their contributions to this project.
Peter Abigail 
Executive Director
Executive Director’s introduction
Neighbourhood watch: The evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia
The nature and evolution of the regional terrorist threat remains high 
on the list of Australia’s national security priorities. Since evidence 
first emerged of the plot against the Australian High Commission 
and other diplomatic missions in Singapore in 2001, the government’s 
security and intelligence agencies have attempted to gain a better 
understanding of Islamist militancy throughout the Southeast 
Asian region.
Between 2002 and 2005, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) emerged as the principal 
terrorist threat to the region. JI conducted multiple bombing campaigns 
against Australian and Western targets across the Indonesian 
archipelago, including most recently a series of suicide bombings on the 
resort island of Bali which killed or injured more than 150 people.
Since then, JI has suffered major losses as a result of the crackdown by 
Indonesian authorities and internal rifts that have effectively seen the 
group divide into two main, competing blocs—a pro-bombing faction 
and a somewhat more conservative mainstream group often referred 
to as the ‘bureaucrats’. Despite these changes, however, JI continues to 
represent a significant threat to both Australian and regional security 
interests, and can still count on a hardcore membership of around 
900 militants. Perhaps more importantly, a cadre of at least fifteen 
first generation JI leaders remain at large, including the Malaysian-born 
accountant Mohammad Noordin Top and Aris Sumarsono, aka 
Zulkarnaen, who allegedly acts as al-Qaeda’s current ‘point-man’ in 
Southeast Asia.
Nearly six years after the first Bali bombings, it is time to take stock of 
the regional security environment and to ask how the Southeast Asian 
terrorist threat might evolve in the future.
Neighbourhood Watch analyses the changing nature of religious 
militancy in Southeast Asia and sets out a framework for understanding 
the forces and trends that are driving jihadist extremism in the region. 
It provides a comprehensive examination of the organisational and 
operational capabilities of the major terrorist groups including JI, the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao 
Executive summary
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Executive summary
and the various groups associated with the current manifestation of Malay Muslim separatist 
violence in southern Thailand. In each case, the nature and extent of pan-regional networks 
and connections are examined.
The report argues that Australia’s response to the current threat environment should focus 
on consolidating recent gains in bilateral counter-terrorism efforts and look to areas of 
further cooperation on a regional or multilateral basis. Especially useful in this regard would 
be reinstituting a high-level political dialogue on terrorism and leading a new diplomatic 
campaign to improve compliance with international counter-terrorism conventions.
The net assessment that emerges from this analysis highlights the changing terrorist 
dynamic in Southeast Asia. Although JI has failed in its efforts to combine two of the 
region’s most active Islamic conflicts into a single zone of ideological convergence, the 
strategic threat from terrorism remains multifaceted and real. In looking to the future, it is 
the ungoverned spaces that have traditionally suffered from endemic religious conflict that 
are likely to pose the region’s most serious long-term problems. It is essential, therefore, that 
Australian and Southeast Asian governments remain vigilant in the face of evolving political 
developments in these areas and work conscientiously to make these ungoverned spaces less 
hospitable to terrorist exploitation.
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IntroductIon
Australia has been largely free of domestic and imported terrorism, 
and still does not confront the same level of threat as other states 
in North America or Western Europe. That said, the country’s overall 
risk profile as a potential target has been substantially heightened 
over the past decade, both as a result of Canberra’s close security and 
defence alliance with the US and the support the former government 
under John Howard gave to George Bush’s post-2001 global war 
against terrorism. As the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) has noted previously, Australia or Australian interests were the 
subject of planned, conducted or aborted terrorist attacks every year 
from 1999 to 2005.1 At the same time, globalisation and increased 
cross-border movements of people, money and commodities have 
rendered redundant the traditional defence afforded to the country 
by geographic distance.
Currently, the main terrorist threat to Australia’s 
regional security interests comes from Islamic 
extremists connected with the Indonesian-based 
Jemaah Islamiyah network …
Currently, the main terrorist threat to Australia’s regional security 
interests comes from Islamic extremists connected with the 
Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, which is now 
generally acknowledged as the most dangerous terrorist entity in 
Southeast Asia. The movement and its various offshoots have already 
been implicated in several attacks that have had a direct impact on 
Chapter 1
Photo opposite: Top militant Abu Dujana arrives in a court for his trial in Jakarta 21 April 2008. 
An Indonesian court sentenced Dujana to 15 years in prison. The military commander of 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) militant group was arrested in June on charges of keeping explosives and 
sheltering fugitives wanted for a series of deadly attacks in the country in recent years.  
© Crack Palinggi/Reuters/Picture Media
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Australia’s security interests, including the October 2002 and 2005 suicide bombings on 
the resort island of Bali (which, together, left 92 Australians dead) and the bombing of 
the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004. In the past few years there have been repeated 
allegations that the domestic agendas of established Southeast Asian Islamist entities have 
broadened and now give greater precedence to the ‘far enemy’ (that is, the US, its allies and 
states endorsing capitalist and/or Western democratic values, as distinct from the ‘near 
enemy’—their respective national governments) and related region-wide imperatives of the 
sort traditionally advocated by JI.
If Australia is to accurately track and measure Islamist 
terrorism in Southeast Asia—and the precise threat that 
it poses to the country’s national security interests—it is 
important that any gaps in understanding are addressed.
Problematically, however, although various ideological and operational ties have been 
identified, verified and documented, the precise nature of Islamist militancy in Southeast 
Asia—both in respect of local groups and JI itself—has yet to be mapped in a definitive 
manner. If Australia is to accurately track and measure Islamist2 terrorism in Southeast 
Asia3—and the precise threat that it poses to the country’s national security interests—it is 
important that any gaps in understanding are addressed. A thorough grasp of the current 
organisational and operational dynamics of local terrorist groups and the extent to which 
they are (or are not) gravitating towards pan-regional designs will allow for a more informed 
and nuanced debate on how best to mitigate the challenge from Muslim extremists based in 
Southeast Asia.
This will not only contribute to the development of counter-terrorism approaches that are 
relevant, credible and sustainable; it will also help to ensure that sensitive internal Islamic 
balances are not upset (and unduly radicalised) by inappropriate policy responses. This 
Strategy paper assesses the current terrorist environment in Southeast Asia. Its purpose is to 
describe the motivations, aims, modus operandi and effectiveness of regional jihadist groups 
and the extent to which they interact across national and international borders. By analysing 
those trends, this paper offers a comprehensive overview of the evolving Islamist terrorist 
threat to Australian security interests. In chapter 2, the report discusses the broad 
parameters and evolving dynamic of JI, detailing the movement’s history, ideological agenda, 
organisational structure, cohesiveness and operational methods. In chapters three and four, 
the report goes on to examine specific threat conditions in two established zones of regional 
conflict outside Indonesia—the Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand and Mindanao 
in the southern Philippines—and the extent to which pan-regional designs promoting an 
Islamic caliphate have gained a hold in these particular areas. The study concludes with some 
basic policy prescriptions for framing Australia’s counter-terrorism policy in Southeast Asia.
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Introduction
Essential
Advantage
At Booz & Company we work closely with 
our clients to create and deliver essential 
advantage in any situation. We bring unique 
foresight and knowledge, deep functional 
expertise, and a practical approach to building 
capabilities and delivering real impact.
This philosophy has been at the heart of 
our company since its formation in 1914. It’s 
lived every day by more than 3,300 Booz & 
Company people across 57 of ces in over 30 
countries. And it’s more relevant today than 
ever before.
From May 2008 we separated our operations 
from the U.S. government consulting business, 
which will continue as Booz Allen Hamilton.
We understand the special relationship 
between the Australian and U.S. defence 
and security communities and will continue to 
collaborate closely in areas of mutual interest.
For our Australian defence and security clients, 
this means we will continue to access the 
global Booz community to ensure we deliver 
world class expertise, global best practices and 
deep insight to our client’s problems.
Booz & Company - a new name for the 
founders of the management consulting 
profession.
Visit www.booz.com.au to learn more.
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Photo opposite: Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir delivers a speech to the Muslim 
community. © 2006 Adek Berry/AFP/Getty Images
the Jemaah IslamIyah network
Background
JI traces its roots to Darul Islam (DI, literally the ‘House of Islam’), 
a movement driven by theological, ethnic and social imperatives that 
was established by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo in the late 1940s. 
The organisation was committed to the creation of an Islamic State 
of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia) and refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of the secular-oriented Indonesian state after the transfer 
of sovereignty from the Dutch in December 1949. In pursuit of its 
objectives, DI launched a series of rebellions across Java, northern 
Sumatra and south Sulawesi, during the 1950s and 1960s that posed a 
direct and serious challenge to the authority of the central government 
in Jakarta. Although the DI insurgency was effectively broken by 
1962, the group’s beliefs were never fully expunged and continued 
to resonate with some Islamic militants throughout the country. In 
1972 two of these radicals, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, set 
up Pesantren al-Mu’min—a boarding school based in Solo, central Java, 
dedicated to the propagation of puritanical teachings. A year later, the 
school relocated to the village of Ngruki where it became known as 
Pondok Ngruki. It is here that many of JI’s original members were first 
indoctrinated into the hardline interpretations of the Islamic faith.4
In 1985 Sungkar and Bashir, together with an inner core of Ngruki 
alumni, fled to Malaysia to escape the perceived anti-Islamic policies 
of the Soeharto regime. During this period of exile they acted as a 
critical ‘way station’ for Indonesians and other Muslims from Southeast 
Asia who were en-route to Pakistan and Afghanistan to study and/or 
participate in the ranks of mujahidin forces fighting the Soviet Union. 
This experience had a profound impact on both Sungkar and Bashir, 
particularly in terms of directing their ideology outwards to the broader 
Chapter 2
Neighbourhood watch: The evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia
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region. This influence became apparent in 1993—the timeframe that most commentators 
agree marks the formal institution of JI as a terrorist organisation. It was during this period 
that expression was given to the establishment of a puritanical Islamic state (Daulah 
Islamiyah) in Indonesia as a stepping stone in the development of a wider regional ‘super 
state’ for all Muslims. This vague and ill-defined goal, dressed up in the language of a salafist 
caliphate, was envisioned to embrace all of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, and the southern 
areas of the Philippines and Thailand.
The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 proved to be a 
significant boon to the emerging JI network.
The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 proved to be a significant boon to the emerging 
JI network. Formerly restricted Islamic groups from across the political spectrum were 
suddenly allowed to operate more freely, allowing Sungkar and Bashir to return to their 
country of origin with their Ngruki comrades and openly espouse pan-regional designs. Just 
as importantly, the inability of the government in Jakarta to retain control over Indonesia’s 
outer islands led to the eruption of major Christian–Muslim clashes that by the end of the 
millennium had plunged Maluku (Ambon) and Sulawesi (Poso) into what amounted to a 
full-scale sectarian civil war. This outbreak of ethno-religious violence provided JI with an 
ideal operational environment in which to recruit fighters, gain battlefield experience and 
consolidate in preparation for its own self-defined campaign of jihadist violence.
The US designated JI a foreign terrorist organisation in October 2002, shortly after the first 
Bali attacks. At the request of both Australia and Indonesia, the group was subsequently 
added to the United Nations’ list of proscribed entities, a move that requires all member 
states to freeze its assets, deny it access to funding and prevent its cadres from entering or 
travelling through their territories.
Ideology and objectives
As noted, JI’s immediate goal is the Islamisation of Indonesia, a vision that dates back to DI 
and its assertion that the only legitimate basis for the state was one that fully embodied 
the Muslim faith as its sole foundation. JI took this original conception and enshrined it as a 
fundamental component of a broader ideological vision that viewed Daulah Islamiyah as the 
necessary catalyst for the restoration of Islamic governance across Southeast Asia.5
According to the group’s ostensible manifesto, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al‑Jama’ah 
Al‑Islamiyya (PUPJI or General Guide for the Struggle of JI, which was first documented in the 
1990s) such an outcome can only be achieved in a two-step process. The first is to cultivate 
a puritanical organisation whose members have a strong sense of religious, social, political 
and, most importantly military identity; the second is to use the group as a platform from 
which to launch armed jihad ( jihad musallah) that is directed against ‘infidels, polytheists, 
apostates, atheists and the [morally] corrupt’ and aimed at the ultimate creation of a 
theocratically pure pan-regional Islamic caliphate.6
  ASPI Strategy    11
The Jemaah Islamiyah network
To expedite this process, PUPJI affirms the need to establish a solid base (qoi’dah sholabah) 
of followers who are steadfast in their obedience and totally committed to the movement’s 
long-term objectives. It is these individuals—who must possess personal strengths of 
faith (quwwatul aqidah), brotherhood (quwwatul ukuwwah) and fortitude (quwwatul 
musallaha)—that are intended to act as the ‘core executor, propagator and guardian of the 
jama’ah’s mission.’ 7
The effort to cultivate a solid base can only be understood in the context of JI’s unwavering 
intent to fulfil its long-term objectives through the force of arms. An enduring theme 
highlighted throughout PUPJI is the idea of JI acting as a distinctly ‘military outfit’. The 
emphasis of the movement as a secret organisation (tandzim sirri), the frequent use of the 
terms intelligence and recruitment (tajnid) and the detailed exposition of how to execute 
armed operations are prominent throughout the manifesto. Those elements, together with 
an increasing orientation towards martyrdom—which is vindicated both as a highly effective 
force equaliser and as the most visible means of establishing a true pioneering vanguard 
to champion the Islamic faith—are strong indicators that JI’s conception of jihad is one 
that is explicitly aimed at combat (qital), as opposed to diplomacy or dialogue. By default 
this negates the perceived validity and utility of other methods of political and social 
engagement such as negotiations and preaching (dakwah).
The lucidity of JI’s ideological and operational vision has suffered in recent years, primarily as 
a result of growing disunity among the movement’s ranks in reaction to attacks that have 
caused significant Muslim casualties. In particular, an increasingly serious disjuncture has 
emerged between two main factions: a ‘pro-bombing’ group that advocates ‘fast-tracking’ 
the goal of a pan-regional Islamism by engaging in a sustained campaign of suicide 
bombings across Southeast Asia—even if these are likely to result in civilian Muslim deaths 
and injuries—and a somewhat more traditionalist bloc (known as the ‘bureaucrats’) that 
asserts indiscriminate attacks are not sanctioned by PUPJI and that JI’s end-state can only be 
brought about by Islamising the whole of Indonesia in order to ‘positively’ tilt the religious 
balance of the wider region.
… the general thrust of JI’s ideological approach can still be 
summed up as one that aims to Islamise Indonesia in the 
expectation that this will ultimately foster the requisite 
conditions for creating a wider caliphate.
Despite this rift, the general thrust of JI’s ideological approach can still be summed up as one 
that aims to Islamise Indonesia in the expectation that this will ultimately foster the requisite 
conditions for creating a wider caliphate. The adoption of force is commonly viewed as an 
integral, if not exclusive means of successfully achieving this outcome. Although differences 
of opinion exist over how quickly JI’s end state can be achieved, and the specific targets to be 
attacked, the long-term goal of instituting a cross-border caliphate as well as the emphasis 
on developing the resources and capabilities of JI cadres to engage in concerted armed 
violence, is largely shared by the movement’s wider membership.
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Organisation and numbers
JI has been described as al-Qaeda’s operational wing in Southeast Asia.8 However, this 
overstates the formality of the relationship between the two organisations. Although 
links were forged between the two groups early on, based largely on a common (although 
not identical) worldview, overlapping membership, access to shared training camps in 
Afghanistan and Mindanao and a willingness to engage in mutually beneficial collaborative 
ventures, JI has developed as a distinct entity in its own right. While it has certainly been 
prepared to accept al-Qaeda funding and technical expertise in the past, the group’s 
organisational structure is one that has been specifically designed to further its own regional 
Islamist agenda.
Initially, JI adopted a vertically integrated network composed of several layers. At the helm 
of the structure was Sungkar, who acted as the preeminent emir or leader of the movement. 
After Sungkar died in 1999, Bashir assumed exclusive responsibility for JI’s spiritual and 
ideological development, remaining in this position until he was arrested on charges of 
treason in October 2002.9 It is believed that the post of JI’s emir subsequently passed on, 
first to Abu Rusdan and then, after his arrest in April 2003, to Ustadz Adung who was 
arrested in 2004 and then Yusron Mahmudi Zarkas (aka Zarkasih), who was himself arrested 
in June 2007.10
Beneath the emir was a regional advisory council (majelis qiyadah) headed by a central 
command (qiyadah markaziyah) and chaired, until his arrest in 2003, by Riduan Isamuddin 
(aka Hambali)—a veteran of the anti-Soviet mujahidin campaign in Afghanistan and 
an important linkman with al-Qaeda. Next came three mid-level councils that oversaw 
religious and disciplinary matters. The main base of the group was made up of four regional 
divisions, or mantiqis, that were subdivided into smaller operational companies (khatibah), 
platoons (qirdas) and squads ( fiah), and defined along geographic and functional lines. 
These territorial cells covered the following areas and functions:
Mantiqi I—Singapore, Malaysia (except Sabah) and southern Thailand: mainly responsible for 
ensuring JI’s economic development
Mantiqi II—Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan): responsible for leadership 
and recruitment
Mantiqi III—Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and the southern Philippines: responsible for 
training and weapons procurement
Mantiqi IV—Australia and Papua New Guinea: responsible for fund-raising.11
In practice, however, it appears that JI worked in a much less centralised fashion than this 
structure might otherwise imply. As a recent report by the US Congressional Research Service 
observed:
[The organisation’s] goal of developing indigenous jihadis [necessarily] meant that JI 
members often had to work with and/or create local groups outside its control. [As a 
result], it is often difficult to sort out the overlap among JI and other radical [entities]. 
Additionally, regional leaders appear to have had a fair amount of autonomy, and … many 
of the cells were compartmentalized from one another [for security purposes].12
At its height in 1999–2000, JI was thought to have been able to count on a total membership 
of around 2,000 activists plus a wider support pool of some 5,000 passive sympathisers 
who had graduated from the various pesantrens under the group’s auspices.13 However, 
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thanks to a concerted crackdown on JI by regional police and intelligence forces over the past 
seven years, possibly as many as 300 cadres have been captured or killed. Crucially these 
‘neutralisations’ have extended to some of the movement’s most prominent and adept 
operational leaders and field commanders, including:
• Hambali—al-Qaeda’s main ‘point-man’ between South and Southeast Asia
• Mohammed Iqbal bin Abdurrham (aka Abu Jibril)—believed to have been the head of 
JI’s Malaysia cell and one of al-Qaeda’s main trainers in Southeast Asia
• Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi—one of JI’s leading demolition experts and head of training 
in Mindanao
• Muklis Yunos—a key linkman between JI and Islamist entities in the southern Philippines
• Mas Selamat Kastari—the former head of JI’s Singapore cell14
• Azari Husin—a former engineer and one of JI’s top explosives experts who was 
particularly proficient in the construction of large-scale chlorate and nitrate bombs
• Zarkasih (aka Nuaim, aka Abu Irysad)—JI’s spiritual emir (following the arrest of Rusdan 
in 2003), recently convicted on terrorism-related charges
• Abu Dujana—the former personal secretary of Bashir, recently convicted on charges of 
possessing illegal firearms and explosives.
Those losses have had a marked impact on JI’s institutional make-up, with the movement now 
far ‘flatter’ and more segmented. Mantiqi I (MI) and Mantiqi IV (MIV) have both been fully 
dismantled. Mantiqi III (MIII) appears to have been folded into Mantiqi II (MII) and reconfigured 
around a new leadership body, the Markaz, which oversees four sections: religious training, 
tarbiyah education, logistics and Sariyah (or military operations, further subdivided in Java into 
region-specific locales known as Ishobas). In addition, there now appear to be three distinct 
geographical commands for Indonesia—the West Area, the East Area and Poso.15
That said, JI can still count on a hardcore membership of around 900 militants and it 
is thought a cadre of at least fifteen first-generation leaders remain at large.16 Those 
first-generation leaders are thought to be at the forefront of the group’s pro-bombing faction 
and its attacks on Western and (perceived) secularly-oriented enemies in Southeast Asia.17 
Six of those individuals have attracted particular attention among local and international law 
enforcement agencies:
• Mohammad Noordin Top, a former accountant who allegedly acted as JI’s top recruiter 
and financier and who, in April 2005, claimed to be overseeing the operations of a 
hitherto unknown terror entity on the Malay Archipelago, the Tandzim Qoedatul Jihad 
Untuk Gugusan Kepulauan Melayu (al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago)18
• Joko Pitono (aka Dulmatin), an alleged protégé of Husin and experienced electronics 
engineer
• Umar Patek, who is highly proficient in the manufacture of chemically-based explosives 
and who is wanted for his role in the 2005 Bali bombings
• Hari Kuncoro, Dulmatin’s brother-in-law
• Zulkifi bin Hir (aka Marwan), who is presently thought to oversee all aspects pertaining 
to military ordinance for regional terrorist attacks
• Aris Sumarsono (aka Zulkarnaen and also known as Daud), who allegedly acts as 
al-Qaeda’s current point-man in Southeast Asia and who is thought to be commander 
of an ‘elite’ JI squad that helped carry out the 2002 Bali attack and the 2003 
JW Marriott bombing.
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Top and Zulkarnaen are believed to be hiding in Indonesia, while Dulmatin, Patek, Kuncoro 
and Zulkifi are thought to be in the southern Philippines in areas under the control of the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
Operational activities and prospects
JI exists as an unambiguously jihadist movement that is constructed along paramilitary 
lines. It asserts the necessity (and religious legitimacy) of engaging in pre-emptive violence 
whenever tactically and strategically opportune. The group has, as a result, emphasised an 
active operational agenda that has involved terrorist attacks (planned and perpetrated) both 
within and beyond Indonesia. Early activities attributed to the movement have included:
• active participation in anti-Christian attacks in Maluku and Sulawesi (1999–2003)
• the attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Jakarta (August 2000)19
• the coordinated bombings of thirty-eight churches across Indonesia (December 2000), 
in which nineteen people died20
• a plot to carry out suicide strikes against military, political, infrastructure and commercial 
targets in Singapore, including the Australian and British high commissions and the 
US Embassy (December 2001)21
• the bombing of a fast-food outlet in Zamboanga City, Mindanao (October 2002), in which 
three people died.
JI’s most audacious and lethal strikes, however, date from October 2002 (see Table 1). 
These operations, all of which demonstrated considerable bomb making22, planning and 
surveillance skills, were mostly justified under the twin rubrics of fighting the ‘far enemy’ 
and fostering the supremacy of Islam across Southeast Asia. Although unquestionably 
spectacular, JI’s post-2002 activities generated considerable controversy within the 
movement: not only did the bombings galvanise concerted counter-terrorist action that 
led to the arrest of some 300 of the group’s cadres, many people in the movement were 
uncomfortable with the large number of Muslim casualties that resulted (something that 
was particularly true of the Marriott and Australian Embassy attacks in Jakarta). Strategically, 
the operations were also considered by some members to be counter-productive, not least 
because they directly contributed to increased pressure on Jakarta to crack down on JI’s main 
territorial base in Indonesia.
Table 1: High-profile JI attacks, 2002–2005
Attack Deaths Injuries
Bali bombings, 12 October 2002 202 209
Bombing of JW Marriott Hotel, Jakarta, 5 August 2003 12 150
Bombing of Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 9 September 2004 11 Over 200
Bombing of Philippine SuperFerry 14, 27 February 2004* 116 320
Bali ‘2’ bombings, 1 October 2005 25 129
* The bombing was carried out as a joint operation with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)—see Table 3.
The net effect of these internal developments has been the splintering of the organisation 
into traditionalist and pro-bombing factions. Although this has no doubt impacted on JI’s 
overall operational capacity, a diminution of its activities in the short-to-medium term is not 
expected. Indeed, recent research points to the continued traction of JI’s ideological message 
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in several other groups in Indonesia, all of which stem from a common DI heritage and all of 
which have the motivation and intention to conduct further terrorist activities. These groups 
include Wadah Islamiyah, Laskar Jundallah, Ring Banten and Mujahidin Kompak.
JI continues to espouse an Islamist agenda, which if not comprehensive, has a type of 
simplistic quality that continues to resonate in certain quarters of the general population. 
The splintering of JI means that there is neither a clearly defined centre of gravity for the 
authorities to attack, nor the existence of a concerted organisational ‘brake’ to curtail 
individual terrorist action. This latter factor will feed into a movement that, while amorphous 
and disaggregated, will be far more difficult to track and predict.
The traditionalists
In looking to JI’s future operations and prospects, the traditionalists can be expected to focus 
on rebuilding and consolidating their position inside Indonesia. They are likely to focus on the 
defence of Muslim interests in the outer islands and the preparation of disciplined mujahidin 
to wage the future Islamic battle first in Indonesia and then more broadly in Southeast Asia.23
In addition to Bashir’s continued preaching and lectures to student groups across Indonesia, 
this consolidation phase is being supported by a new wave of jihadi publications, including 
magazines such as Jihadmagz (which is aimed at a relatively wealthy middle-class readership, 
covers conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya and espouses anti-Western propaganda) 
and sophisticated websites that are aimed at both the Jakarta youth market and middle-class 
audiences. The central message of such publications appears to be the promotion of 
an Islamic caliphate under strict shari’a law. As a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) 
report has acknowledged, JI’s current focus on the dissemination of information through 
a publication network is a direct effort to improve outreach and recruitment as a way of 
rebuilding the organisation.24 It also provides an important source of terrorist financing 
through advertising revenue and the sale of video and other materials.
The radicals
The smaller more radical ‘pro-bombing’ faction, by contrast, will find it increasingly difficult 
to operate in any concerted manner—both as a result of unremitting counter-terrorist action 
and popular rejection of indiscriminate tactics that are viewed as having a negative impact 
on wider Muslim interests.
However, these extremist elements will continue to be able to stage ad hoc, random 
bombings, especially while figures such as Dulmatin, Top, Patek, Mas Selamat and Zulkifi 
continue to remain at large. Attacks will probably be cheap, easy to manage and able to 
be executed by small cells (or even individuals) that can be pulled together at very short 
notice. In particular, the use of individuals previously unknown to the intelligence and 
security services may become a more common tactic. These types of strikes will provide the 
pro-bombers with a useful force multiplier that compensates for their growing weaknesses 
by highlighting a threat potential that, at least in the perceptions of others, exists in all places 
at all times.
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Photo opposite: Armed members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front ride on the roof of trucks in 
Marawi City, on route to a central committee conference in Camp Bushra, Lano Del Sur province 
on the southern island of Mindanao, 7 March 2008. © Darren Whiteside/Reuters/Picture Media
muslIm radIcalIsm In mIndanao
Militant context
Militant Islamist threats in the Philippines primarily centre on separatist 
and jihadist groups based on the southern island of Mindanao and the 
Sulu Archipelago. Three principal organisations presently remain at the 
forefront of national, regional and international concern in this part of 
the country: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG); and a dissident faction of the officially-recognised Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), which made peace with Manila in 
1996,25 generally referred to by security forces in the Philippines as the 
Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG).
In addition to these organisations, the Rajah Soliaman Islamic 
Movement (RSIM) has also been linked to periodic terrorist incidents, 
both in Manila and Mindanao. RSIM, which consists of Christian 
converts (or reverts as they prefer to call themselves) to Islam, 
allegedly acts as a militant arm of the far larger (and legal) Balik Islam 
movement. RSIM’s reputed aim is to establish a theocratic Muslim state 
across the entire Philippine archipelago to rectify what it regards as the 
artificial influx of Catholic/Christian influences brought in first by the 
Spanish and then consolidated by the US occupation.
Security analysts believe that between 2002 and 2005 the RSIM group 
provided logistical support to the ASG, aligning with several of the 
latter’s operations and plans. However, over the past two years, the 
RSIM has been largely destroyed, suffering from the loss of its leader, 
Ahmed Santos (who was arrested in November 2005), and a lack of 
funds. Moreover, some commentators suggest that Islamic converts 
are not widely respected among the Filipino Muslim population as they 
are generally considered to have an overly relaxed attitude to religious 
commitments. According to officials in Manila, the organisation 
Chapter 3
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currently has between seventeen and twenty-five members and is no longer considered a 
threat to national security interests.
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
The MILF was founded in 1984, emerging from an earlier six-year rift with the MNLF, which, 
prior to making peace with Manila in 1996, traditionally served as the main vehicle for the 
insurgency in Mindanao. The organisation’s avowed objective for most of its operational life 
has been the creation of an independent Islamic state—to be governed by shari’a law—in 
all areas where Muslims have traditionally existed as a majority in the southern Philippines. 
Most of the southern Philippines is now Christian dominated, reflecting vigorous migration, 
which has been both spontaneous and actively sponsored by Manila, from the northern 
Luzon provinces. It is estimated that by 1983, as much as 80% of Mindanao’s population 
was non-Islamic. For this reason, the MILF made its demands in the context of areas where 
Moro Muslims were traditionally (as opposed to currently) in the majority. Under the hardline 
leadership of Hashim Salamat, this remained both a central and non-negotiable goal of 
the MILF:
Autonomy will not work…It will only be manipulated and controlled by the Manila 
government…Only the full independence of the Bangsamoro people with an Islamic state 
will solve the problems of Mindanao.26
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The MILF is, by far, the strongest group currently operating in Mindanao. While 
approximations of MILF strength vary widely—largely because many cadres are 
‘part-timers’—most commentators believe its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed 
Forces (BIAF), is able to call on a committed core of between 9,000 and 11,000 members. 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) approximation in 2007 was 11,769 fighters with an 
armoury of some 7,747 weapons that included Garand, M16 and M14 rifles, M230s, landmines, 
locally-manufactured M79 rocket propelled grenades and .50-calibre and .60-calibre 
machine guns.
Combatants are organised into fourteen base commands, each of which falls under the 
overall authority of the BIAF Chief of Staff. The bulk of these fronts are located in central and 
eastern Mindanao, although the group also has an established territorial presence in Basilan, 
Sulu and Zamboanga (see Table 2).
Although the MILF constitutes the most developed and 
well-organised Islamic rebel entity in Mindanao, the group is 
probably weaker today than at any time in the past because of 
territorial defeats it suffered at the hands of the AFP.
Although the MILF constitutes the most developed and well-organised Islamic rebel entity 
in Mindanao, the group is probably weaker today than at any time in the past because 
of territorial defeats it suffered at the hands of the AFP. Those defeats have included the 
capture of its main base at Camp Abu Bakar as-Siddique in 2000 and, three years later, the 
Table 2: MILF base commands
Base command Location Estimated number of cadres
102 Lanao del Sur 1,547
103 Maguindanao 1,536
101 Maguindanao 1,138
113 Zamboanga del Norte 1,121
105 Cotabato 586
114 Basilan 254
106 Sultan Kudarat 211
104 Sarangani 359
107 South Cotabato 1,028
108 Cotabato 514
112 Davao del Sur 260
109 Bukidnon 379
110 Bukidnon 357
111 Agusan del Sur 306
Total 9,596
Note: These numbers do not include the roughly 480 cadres who make up the National Guard Division 
(which represents the hardcore of loyalists to Chairman Salamat) or part-time MILF fighters—hence the 
discrepancy between the table’s total (9,596) and the AFP’s 2007 estimation (11,679).
Source: AFP J2 briefing, Camp Aguinaldo, Manila, January 2008.
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loss of the Buliok Complex, which had been set up as an alternative headquarters. Possibly 
because of its weakened state, the MILF has been prepared to engage in tentative peace talks 
with the Philippine Government which, for its part, appears to have accepted that the group’s 
insurgency does not lend itself to a purely military solution.
This dialogue has progressed rapidly over the past couple of years, facilitated in large part 
by the 2003 death of Salamat and by his replacement with the more politically astute and 
pragmatic Al Haj Murad. Significantly, the new leader has expressed a willingness to revisit 
the issue of secession, hinting that he may be willing to drop the demand for outright 
independence if a genuine level of autonomy is granted to Mindanao. To this end, Murad 
committed to a Mutual Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with the Philippine Government 
in 200327, vowing to crack down on renegade commanders who violate the truce or 
contravene its terms. He has since actively participated in Malaysian-sponsored talks aimed 
at resolving concerns, ranging from those associated with socio-economic development to 
ancestral domain.28
At the time of writing most of those issues had been worked out, with the two sides 
agreeing, in November 2007, on a number of points that would form the basis of a so-called 
Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE): a final autonomous region for Moro Muslims created and 
operating within the constitutional ambit of the Philippine state. Presently, two main issues 
have still to be settled—the size of the BJE and the future of the BIAF. The MILF has stated 
its interest in reinstituting its armed cadre as the basis of an internal security force for the 
BJE, whereas the Philippine Government will almost certainly insist on its demobilisation and 
integration into the AFP. Although the MILF and Manila have yet to resolve those issues, it is 
hoped that an agreement will be reached before the end of 2008.
Although welcome, Murad’s willingness to deal with the Arroyo administration on a 
diplomatic level has served to somewhat complicate the internal dynamics of the MILF. 
Although the group’s leadership and mainstream membership seem sincere in their desire 
for peace, several mid-level field officers have denounced the present negotiations as a 
capitulation to the dictates of Manila and as tantamount to the wholesale betrayal of the 
Moro Islamic cause. These potential ‘spoilers’, who are predominantly associated with the 102, 
103 and 105 base commands, have vowed to continue the armed struggle for independence 
irrespective of any accord agreed to by the MILF central committee. The residual threat 
emanating from these renegade elements is considered to be real, not least because they 
enjoy a substantial degree of operational autonomy on a day-to-day basis. This latitude 
reflects the absence of a single, solid chain of command within the MILF, and is indicative 
of an authority structure that frequently derives from family ties, blood relations and tribal 
affiliations. More specifically, while base commanders may outwardly show deference to 
Murad at central meetings of the group’s executive committee, many are perfectly free to do 
‘their own thing’ when they return home.
The Abu Sayyaf Group
The ASG, literally ‘Bearer of the Sword’, was founded on Basilan Island in 1991 under the 
leadership of Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalini. Originally known as the al-Harakatul al Islamiyah, 
the group’s goals are the eradication of all Christian influence in the southern Philippines and 
the creation of an Islamic state of Mindanao whose ‘nature, meaning, emblem and objective 
are basic to peace.’ These objectives were first set forth in an undated ASG proclamation—
the ‘Surah I‑Al Fatiha’—that professed to refute the false lies and insults hurled at the Islamic 
  ASPI Strategy    21
Muslim radicalism in Mindanao
religion by Christians and that espoused the liberation of Mindanao from the clutches of 
oppression, tyranny and injustice as experienced under the Catholic-dominated Philippines 
Government and military. Despite these pronouncements the ASG has never articulated a 
clear strategic plan for how they would actually establish a pure Islamic state in the southern 
Philippines or, indeed, prepare local Muslims for self-rule.
In line with its defining philosophy, most of the ASG’s 
activities during the 1990s took the form of terrorist 
attacks—mainly shootings and bombings—against churches, 
missionaries, Christian communities and the security forces 
(police and military).
In line with its defining philosophy, most of the ASG’s activities during the 1990s took the 
form of terrorist attacks—mainly shootings and bombings—against churches, missionaries, 
Christian communities and the security forces (police and military). Some of these strikes 
were especially brutal. One noteworthy incident involved a mass raid on the Catholic town of 
Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, that left fifty-three civilians dead.
Although Janjalini originally created the ASG as a movement with the imperative of 
establishing an Islamic state, he quickly tied this local objective to the regional and global 
supremacy of Islam through armed struggle. To that end, the ASG paralleled its anti-Christian 
agenda in Mindanao with an effort to establish logistical and operational links with external 
terror groups.
Concrete evidence of the ASG’s transnational ambitions emerged in 1995 when five of its cells 
were directly implicated in a plot—known as Operation Bojinka—to: (1) target Washington’s 
embassies in Manila and Bangkok; (2) assassinate the Pope and President Clinton during 
separate visits to the Philippines between 1995 and 1996; and (3) destroy US commercial 
airliners flying trans-Pacific routes from American west coast cities. The plan was hatched by 
Ramzi Yousef—the convicted mastermind of the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center 
in New York—and was only foiled when volatile explosive compounds started a fire in the 
apartment that he was renting in Manila.29
The fervour of the ASG’s Islamist agenda—both domestic and international—began to 
atrophy in the wake of the discovery of Bojinka, a process that rapidly gathered pace three 
years later when Janjalini was killed in a shoot-out with Philippine police on Basilan Island. 
At the time this event proved to be a defining moment in the ASG’s evolutionary history, 
triggering a leadership crisis that was rapidly followed by the loss of ideological direction and 
factionalism that effectively saw the group degenerate into a loosely configured, but highly 
ruthless, kidnap for ransom (KFR) syndicate. Several subsequent hostage-takings proved to 
be highly profitable. Abductions of Western tourists in the first half of 2000, for instance, are 
believed to have netted the ASG an estimated $20 million in ransom payments.30
Further vitiating the ASG’s overall operational purpose and direction have been sustained 
military assaults on its traditional island strongholds in the Sulu archipelago. Conducted with 
US training and support31, these operations are thought to have reduced the organisation’s 
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current total membership to no more than 100 hard-core militants (plus a wider pool of 
around 280 active followers). The bulk of these fighters, who remain dispersed in Basilan, 
Jolo and Tawi-Tawi, are estimated by AFP officials to have access to a limited arsenal of no 
more than 298 firearms.
It appears that in recent years concerted attempts have been 
made to re-energise the ASG as a credible and integrated 
Islamic militant force.
It appears that in recent years concerted attempts have been made to re-energise the ASG as 
a credible and integrated Islamic militant force. According to Philippine intelligence sources, 
much of this effort was directed under the combined auspices of Khaddafy Janjalini (the 
younger brother of Abdurajak) and Jainal Antel Sali (aka Abu Soliaman, a self-proclaimed 
ASG spokesman), both of whom sought to return the ASG to its militant jihadist origins in 
the wake of the arrest and killing of several leading bandit commanders post-2004.32 They 
included Ghalib Andang (aka Commander Robot) and Aldam Tilao (aka Abu Sabya), two 
domineering personalities who orchestrated many of the earlier KFR operations claimed 
under the group’s name.33
Although Khaddafy and Soliaman are dead their influence has been significant in reorienting 
the tactical and strategic direction of the ASG.34 The group, while disaggregated, now 
routinely refers to itself by its original nomenclature—al-Harakatul al Islamiyah—a 
re-designation Southeast Asian security commentators believe is indicative of a renewed 
operational focus on jihadist violence.
In addition, the ASG has steadily scaled back its lucrative KFR activities in favour of a more 
explicit interest in hitting civilian-centric and, Western targets across the country. Table 3 
sets out some of the notable attacks and plots attributed to the organisation over the past 
four years:
Table 3: High-profile attacks and plots attributed to ASG, 2004–2007
Date Incident
February 2004 Firebombing of Philippine SuperFerry 14a
February 2005 Coordinated attacks in Davao City, General Santos City and Manila (known as the 
‘Valentine Day’ bombings)
March 2005 Planned strikes on restaurants and nightclubs popular with foreigners in Manila’s 
central business district
March 2006 Bombing of a crowded supermarket in Jolo
January 2007 Planned simultaneous attacks on the sites hosting the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and East Asian regional summits
November 2007 Assassination of Congressional Representative Wahab Akbarb
a This attack left 116 people dead and remains the most destructive act of maritime terrorism to date.
b Although the ASG never claimed responsibility for Akbar’s killing and the exact motivation(s) behind the 
attack remain somewhat cloudy, police intelligence officials believe that the operation was executed by 
Abu Sayyaf militants. Interviews with police intelligence officials, Manila (January 2008).
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The biggest weakness presently afflicting the ASG is the absence of a nominated 
commander who is able to command broad support across the organisation. Radullan 
Sahiron (aka Commander Putol) is the closest that the organisation has to such an individual. 
However, he is old (in his seventies) and suffers from acute diabetes. The two other potential 
emirs, Isnilon Hapilon (aka Salahuddin) and Yasser Igasan, suffer from different but just 
as significant drawbacks. Hapilon is from the Yakan tribe, which is not acceptable to the 
Tausugs, while Igasan (a 36-year-old who combines skills in financial management with some 
leadership experience) lacks military experience and, consequently, is not widely viewed as 
possessing the necessary mujahidin qualities required for leadership.
So long as this current leadership void exists, the ASG will continue to operate from the 
back foot—its renewed jihadist ardour notwithstanding. The greatest danger would be the 
emergence of a charismatic figure who has both religious and military credentials and who 
is able to unite the organisation around a dedicated ideological agenda of Islamist militancy. 
Should such a development occur, it could well alter the overall ASG threat calculus, 
particularly given the existence of nascent logistical networks that the Philippine National 
Police (PNP) believe have already allowed the group to extend its operational ‘footprint’ 
beyond a purely local setting.
The Misuari Breakaway Group
The MBG emerged in 2002 following the arrest of Nur Misuari on charges that he incited 
a November 2001 rebellion in Jolo and Zamboanga City to forestall the election of a 
Manila-backed rival to oust him as governor of the MNLF autonomous area (ARMM) set up 
as part of the 1996 peace accord (see endnote 25).35 The group is mainly composed of MNLF 
dissidents who demand full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement made with the 
Philippine Government, the terms of which they claim have been systematically diluted by 
legislation since passed by the national Congress, and Misuari’s release from prison and his 
return to a leadership position.
The MBG is currently thought to exist as a tripartite arrangement that links three main 
factions led by Commanders Sasiyal, Ajibon and Malik. The AFP estimates that the 
total number of armed pro-Misuari partisans is probably around 660, down from the 
3,200 members at the time of the Zamboanga rebellion. Most of these cadres are thought 
to be under the control of Commander Malik, who is based in Sulu. No publicly available data 
exists on how many weapons the MBG has access to, although clashes with the military 
suggest that the group is able to call on a reasonably well-stocked armoury; AFP officials in 
Manila believe most of these munitions are sourced from MNLF munitions caches that were 
never properly decommissioned following the signing of the 1996 peace agreement.
There are growing reports that the MBG has moved to forge logistical and operational links 
with the ASG, the impetus for which is primarily believed to lie with the Malik faction in Sulu. 
According to AFP sources, much of this support takes the form of ‘right of passage,’ which 
has allowed Abu Sayyaf militants to move relatively freely between Central Mindanao and 
Jolo. Military officials further assert that the Malik sub-group has been prepared to actively 
help the ASG repel security offensives and sweeps in Sulu. Backing of this sort is generally 
believed to reflect common blood, clan and tribal ties that transcend the two organisations 
as well as mutual recognition of so-called pintakasi obligations. These latter principles 
dictate reciprocal responsibilities of communal assistance whenever a group is engaged by 
the military.
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Despite cross-organisational bonds, most Moro observers (including representatives of 
the ‘official’ MNLF) play down the prospect of a full merger taking place between the MBG 
and ASG. These commentators largely agree that cooperation between the two groups is 
strictly tactical in nature, reflecting their fundamentally different motivating agendas: in 
the former case, the imperative is essentially nationalist-driven, while in the latter it is more 
religiously oriented.
JI has exhibited considerable interest in extending its 
ideological influence in the Philippines …
Evidence of links between Moro groups in Mindanao and JI
JI has exhibited considerable interest in extending its ideological influence in the Philippines 
largely because the country is viewed as a particularly conducive logistical and operational 
theatre. Not only have corruption and (post-Marcos) popular democratic sensibilities 
decisively undercut the scope for concerted counter-terrorist action, the minimal Muslim 
presence outside Mindanao necessarily means there is far less risk to Islamist interests 
when carrying out attacks. From JI’s perspective, working with co-opted local groups in 
such an environment constitutes a low-risk way of inflicting large-scale civilian damage that 
can then be levered to operationalise a new hub for trans-regional militant extremism in 
Southeast Asia.
Of the three groups, it is the ASG that currently appears to be most receptive to JI’s 
ideological advances. The mainstream of the MILF has conspicuously moved to distance itself 
from any association with the Indonesian-based network, recognising that in the current 
context of peace talks with Manila, any indication of attachment with JI would be entirely 
counter-productive. Indeed, according to Ghazali Jafar, the Front’s Vice Chairman for Political 
Affairs: ‘JI is very much a concern of the MILF now because it is hurting the interests of the 
Bangsamoro people. It is a problem today and will be a problem in the future.’36
Certain commentators have suggested that MILF’s past connections with JI were a product 
of the group’s Islamist orientation under Salamat.37 While it is certainly debatable as to 
whether this predisposition necessarily translated to a common affinity for pan-regional 
jihadism, it would appear that the current MILF leader has no such interest. As noted 
above, since assuming the mantle of Chairman in 2003, Al Haj Murad has pursued a highly 
pragmatic approach to the Moro struggle, focusing almost exclusively on securing local 
economic and political objectives (rather than pursuing a cross-border religious agenda).
The one complicating factor in this portrayal of the MILF is the attitude of renegade base 
commanders. According to certain Philippine and Western officials, these splinter factions—
which together could amount to 10% of the MILF—not only forcibly reject the current 
leadership posture of Murad, they also purportedly interpret the conflict in Mindanao as part 
of a wider pan-Islamist campaign aimed against secularism, modernity, capitalism and the 
influx of Western values into Southeast Asia. It remains unclear, however, what influence 
these renegade factions retain and the extent to which they are actively (as opposed to 
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rhetorically) seeking to integrate their own agendas with that of JI. The evidence is that ties 
were as much pragmatic or tactical in nature as defined in specific ideological terms.
Links between the MBG and JI would appear to be equally questionable. As noted, Misuari 
dissidents are primarily motivated to seek the full implementation of the 1996 peace 
agreement, meaning that their agenda is both local and ethno-nationalist. Although the 
MNLF has traditionally sought succour from the wider Islamic world, this outward-oriented 
posture has always been directed at underscoring the legitimacy of the Moro claim to 
self-government. There is nothing to suggest that radicals connected to the MBG view their 
struggle any differently and while they have tactically cooperated with the ASG there is no 
evidence that they have been prepared to tap into regional jihadist networks to underwrite 
their activities.
The ASG, by contrast, appears to have gravitated more towards JI. As noted, over the past 
four years explicit efforts have been made to reinvigorate the organisation as a bona fide 
and integrated jihadist force by returning the movement to its roots and re-capturing the 
essence of the internationalist orientation that marked its early years under the direction 
of Abdurajak Janjalini. Ideologically tying ASG to JI is viewed as integral to this objective, as 
it would validate the group’s religious credentials and, thereby, elevate its appeal to a more 
expansive Southeast Asian militant Muslim community.
The growing nexus between the ASG and JI can be evidenced in several respects. It is now 
known, for instance, that the two groups jointly collaborated in several of the more recent 
terrorist incidents that have occurred in the Philippines, including the 2004 attack on 
SuperFerry 14 and the 2005 Valentine Day bombings. According to military and intelligence 
sources, three of the five most wanted JI men in Southeast Asia, Patek, Kuncoro and 
Dulmatin, are currently based in areas under ASG control. Those factors would seem to 
indicate an organisation that, if not in its entirety at least in its core, is moving to extend its 
operational and ideological relevance beyond purely localised agendas and settings. As one 
Western police official observed in the aftermath of the Valentine Day bombings: ‘The ASG 
has never had a presence or interest in [Manila] before. So why now?’ His hypothesis was 
that the group had decisively gravitated to JI and was now conducting operations specifically 
designed to have a larger, regional geo-political impact.38 In similar vein, the ICG talks of the 
emergence of a new generation of Mindanao militants who not only seek to wreak havoc 
against the Philippine state, but emboldened by their interaction with JI, are also once again 
emphasising the salafi‑jihadi tradition of ahl al‑thughoor: warriors defending the periphery 
of the Muslim world and fighting to reclaim territories (local and extra-regional) previously 
lost to Islam.39
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Photo opposite: A Thai soldier patrols next to The Giant Buddha Statue at Khao Kong Temple, 
Narathiwat province, Thailand, 22 May 2007. More than 2,100 people have been killed since 
January 2004 in the southern provinces  of Thailand. © Chumsak Kanoknan/Getty Images
Chapter 4
malay muslIm mIlItancy In 
southern thaIland
Militant context
Separatist violence in the Malay-Muslim provinces of Yala, Narathiwat 
and Pattani in southern Thailand is not new, with a history that dates 
back nearly half a century.40 However, the scale and tempo of unrest 
in this part of the world has dramatically escalated since 2004 to the 
extent that Thailand’s ‘deep south’ is now in the grips of what amounts 
to fully-fledged ethno-religious terrorist insurgency. Between January 
2004 and the end of August 2007, 7,743 incidents were recorded in 
the region, leaving 2,566 people dead (which equates to an average of 
fifty-eight a month or roughly two a day) and a further 4,187 wounded 
(see Figure 1). Although civilians have been the hardest hit (accounting 
for more than 70% of all fatalities), both the police and military 
have also suffered significant losses, with casualties of 711 and 689, 
respectively (see Figure 2).41 For a regional population of only 1.8 million, 
these figures represent a considerable toll.
Unlike the earlier phases of religious and ethnic violence, there does not 
seem to be a centralised organisational nucleus of defined groupings 
behind the current bout of insurgent and terrorist activity. According 
to most commentators, the attacks are the work of an amalgam 
of militants drawn from the decimated ranks of first-generation 
insurgent groupings42 and emergent ad-hoc Islamist entities such as 
the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani and the Barisan Islam Pembebesan 
Patani43, combined with an amorphous collection of disaffected 
youths, out of work farmers, labourers and tradesmen and co-opted 
criminal elements.44
According to Thai police and non-government agencies, this 
amorphous militant base is organised at the district level and based 
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on five functional divisions: political work and recruitment; economic and financial affairs; 
women’s affairs; youth; and armed activity.45 Command and control of these wings falls to a 
pemimpen (literally, district chief), who oversees five assistant pemimpen, each of which has 
five deputies that are, in turn, responsible for a village-based cell of ten commandos ( junwae 
jihad). Although district strike forces typically act independently of one another—deciding 
for themselves who to hit and when—leaders are thought to meet every forty-five days to 
confer on developments taking place in their individual operational zones and/or to plan 
large-scale attacks. It is not known, however, whether a higher leadership structure exists 
to provide greater strategic guidance and direction for these operational units. As one Thai 
official has remarked, ‘this is the key unknown that the security and intelligence services still 
have to uncover.’46
Figure 2: Number of incidents by attack type, January 2004 – September 2005
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Figure 1: Violent incidents in southern Thailand: January 2004 – August 2007
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Actual attacks are reportedly executed by dedicated military wings known as junwae jihad in 
Malay and Runda Kumpulan Kecil in Thai, whose members are reputedly trained in unarmed 
combat, weapons handling, bomb-making and sharp-shooting. Available munitions for these 
squads include grenade launchers, M16 or AK47 assault rifles, shotguns, pistols, machetes 
and knives—most of which are either locally made, stolen from the security forces, or 
purchased from corrupt/co-opted self-defence militia units.
Estimates of the number of people actively engaged in violent attacks vary from 1,000 to 
4,000. If logistical, recruiting and propaganda personnel are included, the figure rises to more 
than 3,000—expanding to anywhere between 5,000 and 30,000 if passive civil support is 
also factored in. By September 2007, Thai security officials were estimating that separatists 
had gained full control of more than 100 of the 1,521 villages47 in the three southern Malay 
border provinces. Independent local commentators, however, have generally portrayed a 
far broader militant presence, with most concurring that more than 90% of the towns and 
hamlets in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat probably have at least one established cell within 
their confines.
The ostensible goal of the current insurgency appears to be the creation of a separate 
Malay–Muslim state within five years (dating from 1 January 2004). The supposed 1,000-day 
plan, discovered during a 2006 search at an Islamic school in Pattani, was allegedly developed 
by Masae Useng, a former Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who is wanted in 
connection with an arms robbery in Narathiwat.48 Beyond this basic objective, the insurgency 
does not seem to be guided by any overarching strategy other than one of fostering 
communal hatred between Muslims and Buddhists and making the southern Malay 
provinces ungovernable.
Neighbourhood watch: The evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia
30    ASPI Strategy  
Despite lacking clear organisational coherence and strategic direction, Malay Muslim rebels 
currently operating in southern Thailand have clearly taken their campaign of violence 
to a level of sophistication and, at times, ruthlessness, not seen in the past. There are 
indications that militants now possess the means to both produce and deploy relatively 
large bombs. For instance, the improvised explosive device (IED) that was used in the 
March 2008 bombing of the CS Pattani (a hotel that hitherto had been generally regarded 
as ‘off-limits’ to militant attacks), involved three fire extinguishers filled with a mix of 
ammonium nitrate packed in a car. This contrasts with earlier IEDs, most of which were in the 
five- to ten-kilogram range and concealed in simple everyday items such as shopping bags, 
Tupperware lunch boxes and PVC tubing.49 Apart from size, the construction of the bombs is 
also more sophisticated. This has been most apparent with mobile phones, which are now 
routinely used to trigger IEDs.50 These mechanisms are generally recognised as being far 
more effective than the older, Chinese-made analogue clocks extremists traditionally relied 
on, not least because they allow for external detonations in clear line of sight of a specific 
target and at a particular time.51
The ability to pull off audacious and complex terrorist operations has also expanded. 
Attacks now often embrace explosions, arson, assassinations and random shootings to 
maximise the overall impact. Coordinated bombings are also more regular. In one notable 
case in April 2005, simultaneous explosions struck the Hat Yai International Airport, the 
French-owned Carrefour supermarket and the Green Palace World Hotel in Songkhla. 
The attacks generated widespread concern—both in Thailand and across the region—not 
least because they represented the first time that Malay extremists had struck outside the 
insurgent-plagued provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.52 Another highly publicised 
incident involved coordinated bombings of twenty-two commercial banks in Yala town 
in August 2006.53 Interestingly, two of the facilities that were struck were Muslim owned, 
which surprised a number of observers. However, the fact that both banks were Thai 
developed suggests that the motivation was still related to the basic Malay ethno-nationalist 
struggle against Bangkok.
Finally, the current instability in the south has been marked by an explicit religious-jihadist 
undertone of a sort not apparent in past years. This undertone has been reflected in attacks 
against establishments associated with Western decadence and secularism such as gambling 
halls and karaoke bars; the distribution of leaflets (allegedly printed in Malaysia) specifically 
warning locals of reprisals if they don’t adopt traditional Islamic practices and the increased 
targeting of monks and other Buddhist civilians—often through highly brutal means such as 
burnings and beheadings. In an apparent Taliban-style effort, such attacks are intended to 
destroy societal fabric by fostering communal fear, conflict and hatred against Muslims seen 
as ‘monafique’ (literally hypocrites to the faith).
Evidence of links between Malay Muslim radicals and JI
Several commentators in Western and regional government, intelligence and academic 
circles have expressed concern that the altered and more acute nature of post-2004 unrest in 
the Malay Muslim provinces is indicative of a growing JI ideological and operational presence, 
similar to that which appears to be impacting on the ASG in the southern Philippines. It is 
reasonable to speculate that JI has attempted to exploit the on-going unrest in southern 
Thailand for its own purposes. Gaining an ideological presence in this kind of environment 
is a well recognised and established practice of the movement, and one that was integral to 
the institution of the mantiqi cell structure that characterised its operational development 
from the late 1990s onwards.
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However, no concrete evidence exists to suggest the region has been decisively transformed 
into a new beachhead for pan-regional jihadism. Although there is a definite religious 
element to many of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the three Malay provinces, this does 
not appear to have altered the essential localised and nationalistic aspect of the conflict. The 
objective remains focused on protecting the region’s unique cultural identity and traditional 
way of life—both from the (perceived) unjust incursions of the Thai Buddhist state and, just 
as importantly, the unprecedented influx of cross-border movements of trade, commerce 
and people. Indeed, there appears to have been an explicit decision by militants not to 
associate themselves with external, non-Malay entities such as JI. In the words of Mah 
(not his real name), a self-professed senior BRN operational commander:
We do not want to have anything to do with these guys [JI]; they are bad news. I told 
them we are only interested in looking after our own territory … Many of our top tok kuru 
(literally headmasters of Islamic boarding schools) believe that if Indonesians become 
involved [in our struggle] we will be like Iraq—a place where Muslims kill Muslims.54
The overriding sense of self-identity that characterises the southern border provinces 
strongly suggests that an in-built barrier against external penetration is firmly in place. 
Informed journalists, academics and security officials routinely stress how difficult it would 
be for a foreign-based entity like JI to come to the region and introduce (much less entrench) 
its ideology, noting that the indigenous population would be extremely unlikely to accept 
any sort of proselytism that emphasised there was a ‘better’ or purer form of Islam to the 
one already there. As one well-respected mufti in Pattani remarked, ‘our people may not be 
respected in the formal sense, but they have an unshakable understanding of their faith.’
Although it is true that the scale and sophistication of the violence has increased, there is 
nothing to link this change in tempo to the input of punitive, absolutist JI imperatives. Indeed 
in the opinion of local commentators, the heightened intensity of attacks merely reflects 
a process of learning and development on the part of indigenous rebel groups, possibly 
combined with the infusion of an increasingly competitive criminal interplay involving 
gambling syndicates, drug lords and corrupt members of the security forces and political 
elite. These same sources also argue that marked violence—far from being propagated from 
outside—is an integral component of (current) extremist Malay strategy in at least three, 
inter-related respects: (1) to scare the local population (fear being one of the main tactics 
employed to control villagers); (2) to demonstrate that active rebel groups can act with 
impunity; and (3) to highlight the general weaknesses of the Thai state.
Perhaps the clearest reason to believe that the southern Thai conflict has not metastasised 
into a broader jihadist struggle, however, is that there has been no migration of violence 
north (much less to other parts of Southeast Asia such as Malaysia) nor direct attacks 
against foreigners, tourist resorts or overt symbols of American ‘cultural capitalism’ such as 
McDonalds, Starbucks or the Hard Rock Café.
By contrast, there appears to have been a deliberate strategic decision on the part of 
militants to explicitly not tie the Malay cause to wider Islamic anti-Western/secular designs 
for fear of the wider ramifications this might entail. This was perhaps best reflected in one 
statement by Kasturi Mahkota, a former Pattani United Liberation Organisation member 
who now claims to act as the self-defined ‘foreign affairs spokesman’ of the southern 
insurgency: ‘There is no interest in taking operations to Bangkok or Phuket. We do not need 
to be on anyone’s terrorist list. Once we are on that list, it is all over.’55
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current trends and 
ImplIcatIons for australIa’s 
natIonal securIty
The Islamist terrorist threat across Southeast Asia has not developed, and 
nor will it evolve, in a predictable or linear fashion. Southeast Asian terrorist 
groups have shown themselves to be adaptive and resilient in the face 
of external disruption and internal divisions. Al-Qaeda’s global message 
of religious violence and intolerance continues to resonate amongst a 
small percentage of the Islamic community, particularly in those relatively 
stateless areas of endemic conflict such as the southern Philippines 
and in remote areas of the Indonesian archipelago. The radicalisation of 
individuals and groups through new media outlets and mediums such as 
the internet and online publications further exacerbates what are already 
complex militant recruitment and indoctrination patterns.
Aside from some recent operational links to the 
Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines, 
JI has been unable to co-opt the two major 
non-Indonesian ethno-religious struggles in 
Southeast Asia to engineer a single zone of conflict.
That said, JI’s organisational structure and its ability to conduct 
large-scale terrorist attacks today are vastly different from the 
original grand strategic designs of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Bashir of the early 1990s. The Mantiqi system is unachievable and 
Photo opposite: Convicted Bali bombers Amrozi (bottom) and Imam Samudra alias Abdul 
Aziz talk during a family visit in Batu prison, Nusa Kambangan Island, 22 November 2007. 
© Beawiharta/Reuters/Picture Media
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probably abandoned. Aside from some recent operational links to the Abu Sayyaf Group 
in the southern Philippines, JI has been unable to co-opt the two major non-Indonesian 
ethno-religious struggles in Southeast Asia to engineer a single zone of conflict. The idea that 
sustained terrorist violence will achieve the political goal of a pan-Islamic caliphate across the 
Southeast Asian region survives only in the most distorted and unrealistic assessments of the 
jihadi faithful. And the supply of new recruits trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan under the 
tutelage of al-Qaeda has largely ended. In this sense, the secular, nationalist and democratic 
project that Indonesia embarked upon only a decade ago has shown itself to be a remarkably 
successful endeavour and a key pillar of regional security and stability.
Counter-terrorism efforts, at national, regional and international levels, will continue to 
have an important bearing on the future direction of the terrorist threat. The Indonesian 
and Philippines national police, in particular, have made enormous strides in operational 
capacity and effectiveness against indigenous terrorist organisations. Supported by 
countries such as Australia and the United States, the counter-terrorism effort will continue 
to deliver substantial security benefits to the region. However, any diminution of resources 
or commitment from regional political leaders could create the time and space for major 
terrorist organisations to re-emerge. After several years of counter-terrorism successes, 
Mas Selamat’s escape from a Singaporean detention facility in March 2008 was a timely 
reminder that there is no room for complacency in the fight against terrorism.
Several conclusions concerning the current threat of Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia can 
be drawn from this analysis. First, there is scant evidence that the JI leadership in Indonesia 
(much less al-Qaeda internationally) has been able to elevate the conflicts in Yala, Pattani, 
Narathiwat and Mindanao to a more serious level. In southern Thailand, Malay-Muslim 
separatists appear to have no interest in externalising their campaign of violence, while in the 
southern Philippines it is only ASG—a disaggregated and operationally weak organisation—
that has in any way gravitated toward JI’s logistical designs. Although some of the leaders in 
those conflicts employ the rhetoric of global Islamist violence and draw on similar historical 
experiences from the Middle East and elsewhere, local ethnic and family ties appear to be as 
strong, if not stronger, in binding these groups together.
Second, the policy response of national governments will have an important bearing on 
the future direction of ethno-religious conflicts in the region. More specifically, the manner 
in which Thailand and the Philippines deal with separatist claims for independence and 
greater political autonomy is liable to impact on the scale and frequency of future terrorist 
attacks. The 2002 dissolution of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre by 
the former administration of Thaksin Shinawatra, for example, was widely seen by many 
commentators as a backward step in Bangkok’s efforts to build a more sustainable peace 
settlement between the Muslim south and the Buddhist north. Although expectations of 
a more meaningful policy mix were raised following the September 2006 military coup 
led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the current government under Samak Sundaravej’s 
People’s Power Party appears more intent on consolidating its position in Bangkok than 
comprehensively addressing Muslim grievances in the ‘deep south’. Similarly, in the 
Philippines, should negotiations between the Arroyo government and the MILF fail to secure 
a final settlement agreement by the end of 2008, it is likely the region will witness a major 
return to violence, quite possibly on a scale not previously encountered.
A third broad conclusion concerns the potential radicalising influence of external groups 
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). JI’s current organisational weaknesses and lull in operations 
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have provided the opportunity for other Islamist groups to engage more directly in the 
political processes of Southeast Asian countries. According to Western diplomats and 
Malaysian political commentators, the group has already made inroads into Malay society 
and is now actively recruiting from prominent tertiary education institutions such as 
the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM—a significant past source of both al-Qaeda and 
JI militants).56 In 2007, HuT managed to organise a rally at a stadium in central Jakarta 
which was attended by more than 70,000 people. Although some commentators dismissed 
this event as a ‘rent-a-crowd’ phenomenon or a case of youthful curiosity, evidence from 
the group’s activities in the United Kingdom and elsewhere shows that these events can 
be instrumental in building a general base of support for the dissemination of radical 
ideas and action. As the former HuT organiser in Britain, Ed Husain, notes in his recent 
book The Islamist: ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir encourages individuals to form an army dedicated to 
a prolonged military campaign…the differences from vigilantism are simply of time and 
scale.’57 In addition to public rallies and support for university campus groups, HuT has also 
developed a sophisticated publishing business that disseminates information to a wide 
global audience. Likewise, the re-emergence of violent jihadist literature in Indonesia through 
glossy new publications such as Jihadmagz is a concerning trend and one that will need to be 
monitored closely.
The final and perhaps clearest conclusion is that jihadist violence throughout Southeast 
Asia has been cyclical since the 1940s. Both of the conflicts discussed in this paper, and 
JI itself, trace their origins back at least sixty years and are deeply ingrained in the history 
of ethno-religious struggles throughout the region. Periods of internal destabilisation, 
such as the immediate post-Soeharto period in Indonesia or the current political instability 
in Thailand, provide opportunities for Islamist groups to exploit religious differences 
for political goals. Where religious conflict is held in check, either through negotiated 
political settlements or through more direct military means, the opportunities for religious 
exploitation are more limited. Given the nascent state of democracy in the region, the cycle 
of conflict and conciliation can be expected to continue.
One of the key priorities for the new Rudd government in 
Australia will be to balance the ongoing counter-terrorism 
effort with a broader policy of comprehensive 
regional engagement.
Policy implications for Australia
The evolution of the radical Islamist threat in Southeast Asia has important implications for 
Australia’s foreign and security policies. Since 2002, bilateral counter-terrorism efforts have 
been at the forefront of Australia’s relations with many ASEAN states, including Indonesia 
and the Philippines. In addition to the negotiation of separate bilateral memoranda of 
understanding on joint counter-terrorism cooperation, the entry into force of the Lombok 
Treaty in February 2008 has committed Australia to a further investment of resources on 
a range of security-related issues with Indonesia, including counter-terrorism operations, 
intelligence cooperation and maritime security.
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Current counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives in 
Southeast Asia*
Attorney-General’s Department
Budget measure: Providing for Australia’s Security—regional counter-terrorism 
assistance; legal assistance 
Funding: $6.8 million under the 2005–06 budget over four years—lapses June 2009
Description: Establishment and operation of a Regional Legal Assistance Unit in the 
Attorney-General’s Department to assist countries in Australia’s region develop and 
improve legal frameworks to combat terrorism and provide effective international 
crime cooperation, especially mutual legal assistance and extradition.
Australian Customs Service (ACS)
Budget measure: Providing for Australia’s Security—regional counter-terrorism 
assistance; improved border control in the Sulu and Celebes Seas region
Funding: $4.1 million under the 2005–06 budget over four years—lapses June 2009
Description: To improve border controls in the Sulu and Celebes Seas region 
(Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) through the delivery of projects aimed at 
strengthening the capacity of relevant agencies to manage national borders, improve 
interagency communication between border agencies, and a range of maritime 
security initiatives.
Budget measure: National Security—improved border control in the Southeast Asian 
region
Funding: $7.1 million under the 2006–07 budget over three years—lapses June 2009
Description: To improve border controls in Southeast Asia including Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand.
Australian Federal Police (AFP)
Budget measure: Investing in Australia’s Security—Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation
Funding: $36.8 million under the 2004–05 budget over five years—lapses June 2009
Description: Establishment and operation of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
and Cooperation (JCLEC).
Budget measure: Investing in Australia’s Security—rapid deployment capability
Funding: $36.8 million under the 2004–05 budget over four years—lapses June 2008
Description: Responding to terrorist attacks in the region and strengthening regional 
law enforcement counter-terrorism capabilities.
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Budget measure: National Security—regional law enforcement liaison and 
capacity building
Funding: $25 million under the 2006–07 budget over four years—lapses June 2010
Description: To enhance the capacity and skills of regional law enforcement officers in 
investigating and countering terrorism.
Budget measure: National Security—counter-terrorism rapid deployment capability
Funding: $34.1 million under the 2008–09 budget over four years—lapses June 2012
Description: To develop the Australian Federal Police’s capacity to respond to terrorist 
attacks in regional countries and to assist in strengthening the counter-terrorism 
capabilities of regional law enforcement partners.
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO)
Budget measure: National Security—improving nuclear and radiological security 
Funding: $5.1 million under the 2006–07 budget over four years—lapses June 2010
— ANSTO: $2 million
— ARPANSA: $1.7 million
— ASNO: $1.4 million
Description: To provide coordinated capacity-building activities in the Asia–Pacific 
region, through workshops, exercises and other education programmes to secure 
radioactive sources, nuclear material and related facilities. 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)
Budget measure: Investing in Australia’s Security—strengthening regional financial 
intelligence units
Funding: $10 million under the 2004–05 budget over four years—lapses June 2008
Description: AUSTRAC assistance is helping to build the capacity of regional financial 
intelligence and additional activity to strengthen the regional anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorism financing environment.
Budget measure: Overseas development assistance—strengthening regional 
financial intelligence units
Funding: $5.5 million under the 2008–09 budget over two years—lapses June 2010
Description: To provide capacity-building assistance to South-East Asia Financial 
Intelligence Unit counterparts for the detection and deterrence of money laundering 
and terrorism financing. This measure will also assist the development and 
implementation of IT solutions aimed at identifying terrorism financing activities.
Continued on next page
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Current counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives in 
Southeast Asia continued
Department of Defence
Budget measure: Investing in Australia’s Security—enhanced regional consequence 
management training
Funding: $0.7 million under the 2004–05 budget, absorbed for expenditure over 
four years (to June 2008)
Description: To provide counter-terrorism consequence management training with 
regional countries.
Budget measure: Investing in Australia’s Security—enhanced regional cooperation
Funding: $0.8 million under the 2004–05 budget, absorbed for expenditure over 
four years
Description: To enhance cooperation with regional counterparts on regional 
counter-terrorism issues.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
Budget measure: National Security—strengthening regional counter-terrorism 
capacity
Funding: $35 million under the 2006–07 budget over four years—lapses June 2010
Description: To improve coordination with counter-terrorism partners; work against 
the threat of terrorists acquiring, developing or using chemical, biological, radiological 
or nuclear weapons; build regional emergency response coordination mechanisms; 
and work with regional governments to promote tolerance and counteract 
terrorist propaganda.
Department of Infrastructure (Office of Transport Security)
Budget measure: Providing for Australia’s Security—regional counter-terrorism 
assistance; transport security liaison
Funding: $6 million under the 2005–06 budget, to be absorbed over four years
Description: To strengthen relationships with transport security counterparts in 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific and identify capacity-building projects that assist 
regional governments bring aviation and maritime security up to world standards. 
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Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)
Budget measure: Providing for Australia’s security—regional counter-terrorism 
assistance; regional border control
Funding: $11.8 million under the 2005–06 budget over four years—lapses June 2009 
Description: Enhancement of regional document fraud detection and immigration 
intelligence capabilities, particularly in detecting document fraud and analysing 
immigration data to produce intelligence. The programs have covered more than 
twenty countries, mostly in the Asia–Pacific.
Budget measure: National Security—enhancing the Regional Movement Alert List 
Funding: $10.9 million under 2006–07 budget over four years—lapses June 2010
Description: To provide real-time access between countries on accurate and 
up-to-date lost, stolen and otherwise invalid passport data. Developed through 
APEC: Australia, the US and New Zealand currently participate; other countries have 
indicated a willingness to join.
Budget measure: National Security—enhancing the Indonesian movement alert 
list system
Funding: $10.1 million under the 2006–07 budget, absorbed by DIAC. Project currently 
due for completion in June 2008
NB: an additional $2.6 million was provided under the 2008–09 budget to further 
support and fund maintenance for Indonesia’s movement alert list system until 
30 June 2011.
Description: The Enhanced CEKAL System project is rebuilding Indonesia’s movement 
alert system at five major ports and at Immigration headquarters in Jakarta. When 
implemented, it will cover approximately 85% of passenger movements into and 
out of Indonesia. The system design allows future scalable roll-out to other ports 
and embassies.
*  For a full list of policy initiatives see individual departments or agencies
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One of the key priorities for the new Rudd government in Australia will be to balance 
ongoing bilateral counter-terrorism efforts with a broader policy of comprehensive regional 
engagement. The central priorities driving this need, however, are not ones that Australia 
and the countries of Southeast Asia have typically relied on to build partnerships in the 
past. For policy makers in Canberra, closer intelligence and law enforcement cooperation 
with non-traditional partners, for example, continues to present difficulties. In part, those 
problems are a function of Australia’s historical alliance responsibilities and previous 
willingness to act outside traditional multilateral structures in support of security interests. 
Some of these issues have been addressed through stronger people-to-people linkages 
established after the 2002 Bali bombings. This is particularly true of the relationship between 
the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), which has developed 
into a close and enduring partnership, evidenced by facilities such as the Jakarta Centre for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation in Semarang. But engagement efforts will need to overcome 
the occasional cautiousness that characterises elements of the regional political dialogue.
Although political agreement to strengthen legal frameworks 
was reached at the 2007 Jakarta ministerial meeting, many 
Southeast Asian countries have yet to enact international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Complacency will remain one of the biggest challenges Australia faces in pursuing 
its counter-terrorism strategies in the region. There are already some signs of this in 
Indonesia. Despite the high levels of financial commitment devoted to capacity building 
in POLRI, potentially useful facilities such as the Multinational Operational Support Team 
(MNOST)58 and the Bomb Data Centre remain underutilised and understaffed. According 
to one Indonesian analyst, elements of the political leadership in Jakarta believe that the 
terrorist problem has diminished and that further counter-terrorism initiatives against JI 
are unwarranted or, at the very least, are unnecessary. Moreover, there appears to be little 
genuine effort across the Indonesian Government to understand the underlying support 
dynamics or the continuing role of religious schools associated with the JI movement and 
affiliated jihadist groups. Similarly, Philippine Government officials now believe the Moro 
Muslim terrorist threat is in its last throes and that it has been surpassed by the re-emergent 
Communist insurgency. As noted above, however, should current talks with the MILF fail to 
bear dividends, a major return to violence in Mindanao is likely.
In order to sustain Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region, and to support the 
country’s broader national security interests, several policy developments should be 
considered. First, Canberra will need to demonstrate a long-term political commitment 
to multilateral security cooperation as a central pillar of regional engagement. Bilateral 
counter-terrorism initiatives will remain an important cornerstone of this endeavour. But 
it will also require a more concerted effort to bring the individual elements of Australia’s 
regional counter-terrorism policy into a single program of action. To this end, Australia should 
consider hosting another round of ministerial-level talks that would continue the work of the 
previous sub-regional ministerial conference held in March 2007. A particular focus for this 
meeting would be dealing with the recent upsurge in jihadist publications as part of a more 
comprehensive counter-radicalisation strategy across the region.
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Second, Australia could lead a diplomatic campaign to have all ten ASEAN countries sign 
and ratify each of the thirteen United Nations conventions dealing with counter-terrorism. 
Although political agreement to strengthen legal frameworks was reached at the 2007 
Jakarta ministerial meeting, many Southeast Asian countries have yet to enact international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. As the following table shows, these include 
accords on hostages, nuclear materials, plastic explosives and nuclear terrorism. Although 
signing international conventions will not, by itself, lead to a diminished terrorist threat, it will 
help to consolidate international legal norms that criminalise terrorist behaviour.
Table 4: Status of participation by ASEAN member states in the 13 universal instruments related to the 
prevention and suppression of terrorism
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x x x x x x x x x x  
Cambodia x x x x x x x x x x x  
Indonesia x x x x x x  
Lao DPR x x x x x x x  
Malaysia x x x x x x x x x  
Myanmar x x x x x x x x x x x  
Philippines x x x x x x x x x x x x
Singapore x x x x x x x x  
Thailand x x x x x x x x x
Vietnam x x x x   x x x   x  
Third, Australia needs to pay close attention to the internal dynamics of states not presently 
afflicted by Muslim conflicts but which may come to play an important role in fostering 
or otherwise facilitating hardline jihadist designs. Cambodia, for example, has often been 
identified as a potential logistical hub for Islamic extremism because of its lax border control, 
endemic corruption, entrenched criminal activity and existence of a small but substantial 
Muslim population. Although there is no evidence, to date, that international or regional 
terrorists have managed to gain a foothold in Cambodia by co-opting local Muslims, this 
could change should the Hun Sen regime move to institute draconian domestic security 
policies in response to a perceived extremist threat. Although presently an unlikely prospect, 
a violent overreaction on the part of Phnom Penh could lead to a dangerous radicalisation 
of a Muslim minority community that continues to exist against a backdrop of real 
socioeconomic marginalisation. This at least partially explains the surge of violence that has 
been so prominent in southern Thailand since 2004 and that could certainly be seen as a 
precursor of what might occur in Cambodia under similar circumstances.
Another state to watch is Malaysia, where it has become increasingly apparent that radical 
Islam is being fuelled, somewhat paradoxically, by the policies of the central administration. 
Various commentators have observed that a troubling ‘enabling environment’ for extremism 
may have begun to surface as a result of the polemics of the ruling United Malays National 
Organisation, which aims to give institutional expression to a more fundamentalist ideology 
in order to win the Malay ethnic vote and, thereby, outflank the Parti Se-Islam Malaysia 
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opposition.59 Moreover, Malaysia has produced some of JI’s most infamous leaders, including 
Top, Husin and Marwan, and in certain quarters the residual pull of a pan-Islamic outlook 
remains strong—perhaps best reflected by the growing visibility of HuT at campuses such 
as UTM. Both suggest a latent potential for JI-type radicalisation exists in the country and 
that close attention will therefore need to be focused on domestic religious developments—
particularly as they relate to the overall course of Islamic revivalism currently taking place 
within the indigenous Malay community.
A fourth initiative would be to assist Indonesia and other regional countries with legal 
reforms that would ban terrorist organisations such as JI. Senior Indonesian officials, 
including Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai from the Office of the Coordinating Ministry for 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs, have advocated this type of action for some time. It is 
noteworthy that despite a recent statement by the prosecuting judge in the sentencing of 
Abu Dujana and Zarkasih that JI was a ‘forbidden organisation’, Jakarta has still to formally 
proscribe the movement under Indonesian law. Helping Southeast Asian states develop 
stronger penalties for terrorist offences and/or clearer standards on what constitutes 
admissible evidence in court would also be useful in terms of strengthening legislative tools 
available for countering militant extremism in the region.
Finally, Australia should give further consideration to supporting alternative education 
programs for Indonesian students currently enrolled in the thirty-six pesantren that are 
known to be associated with JI in central and East Java. In particular, Pondok Ngruki remains 
a potential source of future jihadi recruits because of its continuing propagation of a hardline 
Islamist curriculum. Although the Australian Government has committed $30 million (to 
be disbursed over the five-year period from 2004–09) on learning assistance programs 
for Islamic schools in Indonesia, with more than 40,000 madrassah scattered across the 
country this money is thinly spread. A more targeted funding initiative specifically aimed at 
influencing the curriculum of JI-related schools would have potentially greater payoffs in 
terms of turning young Indonesians away from the jihadist pathway. While certainly not an 
easy task and one that would need to be closely coordinated with the Indonesian Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, stopping the propagation of subverted Islamist ideas through the 
educational system is a critical element in the long-term fight against religious extremism 
in Southeast Asia.
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Intelligence Review (September 2006), 54.
56 Author interviews, Kuala Lumpur, September 2006.
57 Ed Husain, The Islamist (London: Penguin, 2007), 153.
58 MNOST is meant to act as a fully exploitable intelligence base populated by and 
disseminated to the six participating states: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Australia.
59 Author interviews, terrorism analysts, Malaysia and Bangkok, August–September 2006. 
According to the constitution, only practicing Muslims can be Malay; this necessarily 
means that ethnic politics are automatically defined on a religious basis.
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AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM Moro National Liberation Front autonomous area
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BJE Bangsamoro Judicial Entity
BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasional
DI Darul Islam
HuT Hizb ut-Tahrir
ICG International Crisis Group
IED improvised explosive device
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
KFR kidnap for ransom
MBG Misuari Breakaway Group
MILF The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MNOST Multinational Operational Support Team
PNP Philippine National Police
POLRI Indonesian National Police
PUPJI Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyya
RSIM Rajah Soliaman Islamic Movement
UTM Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
Acronyms
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About ASPI
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, 
non-partisan policy institute. It has been set up by the government to 
provide fresh ideas on Australia’s defence and strategic policy choices. 
ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and 
defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering 
strategic expertise in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand 
the critical strategic choices which our country will face over the coming 
years, and will help government make better-informed decisions.
For more information, visit ASPI’s web site at www.aspi.org.au.
ASPI’s Research Program
Each year ASPI will publish a number of policy reports on key issues 
facing Australian strategic and defence decision makers. These reports 
will draw on work by external contributors.
Strategy: ASPI will publish up to 10 longer studies on issues of critical 
importance to Australia and our region.
Strategic Insights: A series of shorter studies on topical subjects that 
arise in public debate.
Special Reports: Generally written by ASPI experts, SPECIAL REPORTS 
are intended to deepen understanding on critical questions facing 
key strategic decision-makers and, where appropriate, provide policy 
recommendations. In some instances, material of a more technical 
nature may appear in this series.
Specialist Publications: ASPI also produces valuable reference tools, 
such as The Cost of Defence and the Australian Defence Almanac.
Strategic Policy Forums are online roundtable discussions undertaken 
when a subject of critical importance requires debate. They bring 
together a range of experts to discuss the main policy alternatives, 
the results of which provide policy makers and the broader public 
with accurate and authoritative information about crucial strategic 
policy choices.
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Policy Analysis: Generally written by ASPI experts, POLICY ANALYSIS is provided online to 
give readers timely, insightful opinion pieces on current strategic issues, with clear policy 
recommendations when appropriate.
Commissioned Work: ASPI will undertake commissioned research for clients including the 
Australian Government, state governments, foreign governments and industry.
ASPI’s Programs
There are four ASPI programs. They will produce publications and hold events including 
lectures, conferences and seminars around Australia, as well as dialogues on strategic issues 
with key regional countries. The programs are as follows.
Strategy and International Program: This program covers ASPI’s work on Australia’s 
international security environment, the development of our higher strategic policy, 
our approach to new security challenges, and the management of our international 
defence relationships.
Operations and Capability Program: This program covers ASPI’s work on the operational 
needs of the Australian Defence Force, the development of our defence capabilities, and the 
impact of new technology on our armed forces.
Budget and Management Program: This program covers the full range of questions 
concerning the delivery of capability, from financial issues and personnel management 
to acquisition and contracting out—issues that are central to the government’s 
policy responsibilities.
Outreach Program: One of the most important roles for ASPI is to involve the broader 
community in the debate of defence and security issues. The thrust of the activities will be 
to provide access to the issues and facts through a range of activities and publications.
ASPI Council Members
ASPI is governed by a Council of 7 members representing experience, expertise and 
excellence across a range of professions including business, academia, and the  
Defence Force. The Council includes nominees of the Prime Minister and the  
Leader of the Opposition.
Chairman
Mr Mark Johnson
Deputy Chairman
Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross (Retired) AO, MBE
Members
Major General Peter Abigail (Retired) AO
The Honourable Jim Carlton AO
Professor Alan Dupont
Mr Stephen Loosley
Brigadier Jim Wallace (Retired) AM
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Janice Johnson
Publications and Media 
Liaison Officer
Renee Kirkham
Australian National Security 
Project Director
Carl Ungerer
Budget and Management 
Program Director
Mark Thomson
Events Coordinator
Paula Dolan
Receptionist
Louise Ayers
Director of Research 
Programs
Anthony Bergin
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Andrew Davies
Business Manager and 
Company Secretary
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Cover image: Members of the Philippine’s largest Islamic rebel group Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) take up positions at a mosque inside the guerrilla base during the central 
committee hearing at the southern island of Mindanao 11 March 2008.  
© Romeo Ranoco/Reuters/Picture Media
About ASPI
ASPI’s aim is to promote Australia’s security by contributing fresh ideas to strategic 
decision-making, and by helping to inform public discussion of strategic and defence issues.  
ASPI was established, and is partially funded, by the Australian Government as an independent, 
non-partisan policy institute.  It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with 
broad membership.  ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to 
express or reflect the views of the Australian Government.
The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate 
and understanding of strategic and defence issues.  They reflect the personal views of the author(s) 
and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.
Important disclaimer
This publication is provided on the basis that it does not constitute any form of professional or other 
advice or services on the part of the publisher or the authors. No person should rely on the contents 
of this publication without first obtaining advice from a suitably qualified professional person.
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Peter Chalk
Dr Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst with the RAND Corporation, Santa 
Monica, California. He has worked on a range of projects, including studies 
examining unconventional security threats in Southeast and South Asia; 
new strategic challenges for the US Airforce (USAF) in Latin America, Africa 
and South Asia; evolving trends in national and international terrorism; 
Australian defence and foreign policy; international organised crime; the 
transnational spread of disease; US military links in the Asia–Pacific; and 
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with the UK Armed Forces.
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Neighbourhood watch
The evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia
The regional terrorist threat remains high on the list of Australia’s national security priorities. 
But the absence of a major bombing campaign in recent years has prompted some 
commentators to argue that we have seen the end of jihadist violence in Southeast Asia. 
Nearly six years after the first Bali bombings, it is time to take stock of the regional security 
environment and to ask how the Southeast Asian terrorist threat might evolve in the future.
Neighbourhood Watch analyses the changing nature of religious militancy across 
Southeast Asia and sets out a framework for understanding the forces and trends that are 
driving jihadist extremism in the region. It provides a comprehensive examination of the 
organisational and operational capabilities of the major terrorist groups including Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao and 
the various groups associated with Malay Muslim separatist violence in southern Thailand. In 
each case, the nature and extent of pan-regional networks and connections are examined.
Although these groups draw their rhetoric and ideology from the global jihadist movement, 
this ASPI paper shows that local ethnic and family ties remain a strong influence on group 
dynamics and linkages. As a result, the JI leadership in Indonesia has failed in its stated 
efforts to engineer a single zone of regional conflict. And the idea that sustained terrorist 
violence will achieve the political goal of a pan-Islamic caliphate across the region survives 
only in the most distorted and unrealistic assessments of the jihadi faithful.
The structure and organisation of these groups may have changed, but the underlying 
threat of terrorism remains. In particular, the policy responses of national governments 
will have an important bearing on the future direction of ethno-religious conflicts in the 
region. Complacency will remain one of the biggest challenges we face in pursuing effective 
counter-terrorism policies in the region.
Neighbourhood Watch makes a number of recommendations on the appropriate next 
steps in Australia’s regional counter-terrorism strategy including formalising the high-level 
political dialogue between ministers; paying closer attention to the enabling environment 
for terrorism in neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Cambodia; leading a regional 
diplomatic campaign to encourage universal adoption of international counter-terrorism 
conventions; assisting Indonesia with further legal reforms; and providing more aid to the 
Indonesian education system to end the indoctrination and radicalisation in schools that are 
associated with terrorism. 
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